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IN THE 2CPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARA OTTESON and NELLIE A. 
OTTESON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs 
RICHARD D. MALONE and HILA SUE 
MALONE, husband and wife, 
Appellants-Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 15478 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil case wherein the Appellants appeal from 
that portion of the trial court judgment declaring Appellants' 
option to purchase real property void and denying Appellants' 
demand for specific performance of said option. Appellants 
also appeal from the Order denying their Motion for New Trial 
and Alternative Relief by Amendment of Findings, Conclusions, 
and Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Edward 
Sheya, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court for Emery 
County on December 7 and 8, 1976. The Court declared void the 
option to purchase provisions of a "Lease and Option" executed 
between the Appellants and the Respondents. The Court also 
denied the Appellants' demand for specific performance of the 
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option to purchase and denied Appellants' Motion for New Trial 
and Alternative Relief by Amendment of Findings, Conclusions, 
and Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek judgment declaring their option to pur-
chase valid and granting their request for specific performance 
of said option. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case came for trial before the Honorable Edward Sheya, 
District Judge, on December 7 and 8, 1976. That portion of the 
Judgment appealed from regards an instrument entitled Lease and 
Option executed by the appellants and the respondents. 
The appellants had previously purchased from the respondents 
10 acres of land without water rights. Thereafter,on June 27, 
1974, appellants prevailed on the respondents to lease them 
an additional 28 acres which could be irrigated. Considerable 
discussion followed concerning the exact nature of the lease. 
Eventually, Mrs. Otteson suggested that Mr. Boyd Bunnell, 
Attorney at Law, be contacted to draw up the necessary document. 
Because of her poor health, Mrs. Otteson did not personally see 
Mr. Bunnell, but Mr. Otteson and Mrs. Malone visited his office. 
Mr. Otteson, however, had difficulties with the batteries in 
his hearing aid and testified that he was unable to hear during 
the meeting with the attorney. 
The instrument entitled Lease and Option was subsequently 
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mailed to the parties who all testified that they had read the 
same. 
Again, the parties discussed the instrument and decided 
that certain provisions needed clarifying. The document was 
returned to the attorney who re-wrote il accordingly and sent 
the second draft to the parties. 
The testimony at this point is divergent. Mr. Otteson 
testified that he and his wife read and signed the Lease and 
Option at home. The appellants claim that all four parties 
met together and that Mr. Malone read aloud the second draft, 
after which all of the parties signed the document. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE APPELLANTS' 
PRAYER FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OPTION TO 
PURCHASE RESPONDENTS' REAL PROPERTY BECAUSE THE 
RESPONDENTS ARE BOUND BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
THE LEASE AND OPTION AS CONTAINED WITHIN THE FOUR 
CORNERS OF THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT. 
The Lease and Option at issue in this case is neither a 
lengthy nor a legally complex instrument. It is but three 
pages long, neatly written in standard size type, and clearly 
labeled LEASE AND OPTION. There are only nine provisions 
listed under its "terms and conditions". Three of those nine 
provisions refer specifically to the right of the Appellants 
to purchase the property and how that right is to be exercis~· 
In short, the Lease and Option is simple and unambiguous. 
The trial Court decided early in its proceedings that 
1 
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no question of fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence 
was involved. (Tr. 123) Barring these factors, the Respondents 
should be bound by their signatures on this straight-forward 
instrument. They should not now be permitted to admit evidence 
varying the terms of the instrument. In this regard, the 
authors of 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Section 367 at 
page 383 state: 
"Generally speaking, evidence is inadmissible to vary 
the unambiguous terms of a written lease granung the lessee 
an option to purchase the premises. . . An option to 
purchase in a lease constitutes a contract of sale when 
the option is exercised, and it has been held that it may 
be binding to such an extent that a court of equity will 
remove it as a cloud upon title even after the period 
of the lease has terminated," 
In April of 1974, the Utah Supreme Court handed down a 
decision which bears directly on the instant case. There 
the Plaintiff-Appellant was a real estate,,pro)rnr appealing 
from a lower court decision denying his recovery of a broker's 
commission. A printed provision in the "Exclusive Right to 
Sell" document was at issue, and the defendant persuaded the 
lower court that the provision, although precisely written, 
was not the actual agreement of the parties. The Supreme Court 
in reversing the judgment emphasized the importance of excluding 
parol evidence in the case of an instrument containing unambiguous 
terms: 
"Parol Evidence may be received to clarify ambiguous 
language in a contract, to show what the agreement was 
relative to filling in blanks, and to supply omitted 
terms which were agreed upon but inadvertently left out 
of the written agreement. However, under the general 
rule which is applicable here, parole evidence may 
not be given to change the terms of a written agreement 
which are clear, definite, and unambiguous. To permit 
j 
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that would be to cast doubt upon the integrity of all 
contracts and to leave a party to a solemn agreement 
at the mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given 1 
by one who in the subsequent light of events discovers tro' [ 
he made a bad bargain. " 1 
Written words can be examined so as to ascertain what 
they stand for in connection with particular conduct or 
particular objects. Thus expressions of the parties 
prior to and contemporaneous with the execution of a writt,, 
instrument may be helpful in understanding the meaning of , 
the language used. However, the defendant here does not 
seek to explain the meaning of a paragraph. He simply 
wants the court to eliminate it in its entirety. This , 
the courts cannot do." E. A. Strout Western Realty Agencv,: 
Inc., vs Owen H. Broderick 522 P2d 145, 146 (1974). i 
The Court buttressed this position by also citing ~· 
Moran, Inc. vs First Security Corporation, 82 U 316, 24 P2d 
384 (1933); Hatch vs Adams, 8 U2d 82, 329 P2d 285 (1958); and 
Fox Film Corporation vs Ogden Theatre Co., Inc., 82 U 279, 17 
P2d 294 ( 1932). 
An earlier case, Rainford vs Ryt ting, 22 U2d 252, 451 P2c 
769 (1969) had met with similar treatment by the court. There 
a corporate shareholder brought an action against two other 
shareholders seeking to hold them liable as guarantors of a 
corporate contract for the repurchase of plaintiff's stock. 
The Supreme Court held that the defendants' affidavit respoo~ 
to the plaintiff's request for summary judgment was inadequa~ 
because it c6nsisted orily of inadmissible parole evidence. 
In so holding, the Court on pages 771 and 772 quoted from £.:J· 
Moran, Inc, vs First Security Corporation supra. 
"The rule is well settled that, where the parties have 
reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and 
certain agreement, it will, in the absence of fraud, be 
conclusively presumed that the writing contained the 
whole of the agreement between the parties, that it is 
a complete memorial of such agreement, and that parole 
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evidence of contemporaneous conversations, represntations, 
or s~atements ~ill not be received for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of the written document." 
Again, the "LEASE AND OPTION" is an unambiguous document 
written in terms of common usage. A reasonable man perusing 
the instrument could readily ascertain that two things are the 
subjects of the instrument: A lease, and an option to purchase. 
Considering that approximately 1/3 of the document refers directly 
to the option and that words and phrases such as "purchase", 
"purchase price", "fair market value" and "retain a life estate", 
are scattered throughout the document it is difficult to believe 
that the Respondents were not cognizant of the purpose of the 
instrument, especially considering the testimony by Mr. Otteson 
at trial that he had read the document. 
The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to protect par-
ties of forthright contracts. Since it is difficult to imagine 
an instrument more concise and clear than the Lease and Option 
in the instant case, justice requires that the Appellants be 
protected in their contractual expectations. To permit other-
wise is to preclude the Appellants from a bargain which they made 
every effort to guarantee by a precise writing. The very pur-
pose of the parole evidence rule as stated by CJS points out 
the need for its application in the present case: 
"The rule is founded on the long experience that written 
evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that 
which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be 
unsafe, when parties have expressed the.terms of their 
contract in writing to admit weaker evidence to control 
and vary the strong~r and to show that the parties intended 
a different contract from that expressed in the writing 
signed by them. It is obvious that written ~nstrum~n~s 
would soon come to be of little value if their explicit 
provisions could be varied, controlled, or superseded by 
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parol evidence, and it is also plain that a different 
rule would greatly increase the temptations to commit 
perjury ... "32A CJS Evidence Section 851 at page 216. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS MIS-
UNDERSTOOD THE OPTION TO PURCHASE, THAT SAID MISUNDER-
STANDING CONSTITUTED UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF FACT, AND THAT 
SAID UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF FACT VOIDS THE OPTION TO 
PURCHASE. 
On page 120 of the Transcript of the trial, Counsel for t~.E I 
Appellants. moved for judgment in their favor regarding the 
Lease and Option, claiming that the Respondents had not sustaine: 
the burden of proof of showing any fraud, misrepresentation, 
or undue influence. After oral arguments by both counsel, the 
Court replied to the motion: 
"I'll tell you what I'm going to do. If counsel would 
like an opportunity to brief this, I don't want to be 
hasty on this thing, but that is the way it looks to me / 
at this time and I will take your motion under advisement. 
If you care to submit written memoranda to me on this 
question about whether that consideration extends to the 
option or not. But I think that is the decisive factor 
clearly if there was no consideration for that option. 
I don't think you have a valid option or a binding option. 
1 And would you like time to brief that before making a j 
ruling?" 
Both counsel then agreed to take two weeks to write memor1:·1 
<d'a · directed to the question of the adequacy of consideratio~., 
which they thereafter submitted to the Court. 
The Court, however, in coming to its Memorandum Decisior, 
completely bypassed the issue of consideration, the factor wW, 
it claimed to be decisive, and ruled in the Respondents' fa~r 
on the grounds of unilateral mistake. (M. D. pages 2, 3, & 41. 
This was clearly prejudicial to the Appellants who had addre 5 
i 
___... 
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lhe consideration issue as requested and sufficient to con-
stitute a substantial error as required by Rule 61 URCP. 
This in itself should be grounds for overturning the lower 
Court's decision. 
Moreover, it is clear from the testimony at trial that 
Respondents had ample opportunity to fully understand the 
document which they signed. Mr. Otteson testified that he 
had at least two conferences with Malones regarding the document 
before it was ever drafted (T. 42) ~ that he had good 
eyesight and could read (T. 43); and that both Respondents 
read the intrument (T. 45 & 46). He further testified that 
he discussed the first draft of the Lease and Option with the 
Appellants before sending it back to the attorney and when the 
second draft arrived both Respondents again read it. (T 72 & 82) 
Mrs. Malone testified that the first draft was returned 
in order to specify that lease payments be credited to the pur-
chased price (T. 127) and when the second draft arrived, Mr. 
Malone read it aloud to all four parties before they signed 
it. (T, 129) 
Mr. Malone, in turn, testified that the first draft was 
corrected specifically to clarify the purchase money agreement 
and that he read aloud the Lease and Option to all of the 
parties. (T. 148 & 149) 
The Respondents, therefore, had ample opportunity to 
study both drafts of the document before signing. Mr. Otteson 
verified that both of the Respondents had read the final 
document and that he himself had realized when he signed that 
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the option provision was within the instrument. In its F 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial Court concluded that 
Mr. Otteson appeared to be in "good health and of sound and 
disposing memory". 
It is clear from the foregoing that the Respondents had 
every occasion to study the Lease and Option and to consult iiit 
the attorney who had prepared it. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Garff Realty Co. vs Better, 
Buildings, Inc., 234 P2d 842 (1951) considered an action broug: 
to recover a real estate broker's commission where the central 
issue concerned the defendant's knowledge of what he had si~& 
On page 844 the Court oointed to the negligence of the defend~ 
in not exercising care in what he signed: 
"The trial court properly sustained the objection to the 
question: 'At the time you signed this were you aware 
of the provision in that last paragraph?' There was no 
plea of mistake, fraud or overreaching·, or of misrepre-
sentation. The answer of the defendant to the effect 
that the agent of 'defendant who executed said agreement 
was not aware of the provision of said agreement relati~ 
to the payment of the commission and that it was not 
the intention of the defendant to become bound for the 
payment of any commission,' does not sufficiently state 
any legal defense. The governing rule is thus stated i~ 
12 Am Jr, Contracts, Section 137, pp. 628-29: Ignorance 
of the contents of an instrument does not ordinarily 
affect the liability of one who signs it. If a man 
acts negligently and in such a way as to justify others 
in supposing that the writing is assented to by him, he 
will be bound both at law and in equity, even though he 
supposes the writing is an instrument of an entirely dif· 
ferent character. The courts appear to be unanimous in 
holding that a person who, having the capacity and an 
opportunity to read a contract, is not misled as to its 
contents and who sustains no confidential relationship 
to the other party cannot avoid the contract on the groul 
of mistake if he signs it without reading it, at least~, 
the absence of special circumstances excusing his fa11~1' 
to read it, If the contract is plain and unequivocal Hi 
its terms, he is ordinarily bounct thereby." 
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Another case decided in the same year, Ashworth et al vs 
Charlesworth et al., 231 P2d 724 (1951) touched on the negli-
gence of a party signing a contract and its relationship to a 
claim of unilateral mistake: 
"Williston on Contracts, Section 1577, P. 4407, explains 
the effect of negligence on a contract as follows: 'Where 
the signer of a writing has made an innocent mistake as 
to the nature of his act without carelessness whether 
induced by fraud or not, the writing is not his expression 
and there is no contract. But if a man acts negligently, ' 
and in such a way as to justify other in supposing that 
the terms of the writing are assented to by him and the 
writin is acce ted on that su osition he will be bound 
both in law and in equity ... ' Emphasis added by:the Court) And 
in Section 1596, on page 4447, the author states: 'It is 
frequently said that equity will not reform or rescind a 
contract if the petitioner has been guilty of negligence, 
or at any rate of gross negligence. That no such principle 
can be laid down as a universal rule is obvious. In many 
if not most cases of mistake in the expression of a con-
tract where reformation is granted, there is some element 
of lack of care, but, at least, if the mistake is mutual 
and each party has ·~een careless in failing to make a 
contract expressing the real intention of both, there 
seems no reason why relief should not be granted, unless 
this is made inequitable by some change of position other 
than merely entering into the contract in question. But 
if unilateral mistake, where there is no fraud or ineqUTta-
ble conduct, is ever to be regarded as sufficient ground 
for the rescission of a bi-lateral contract, there is more 
reason why a court of equity should confine its jurisdic-
tion to cases where the party seeking relief has been free 
from negligence, since the blame of the situation lies 
wholly on the party seeking relief. . . " (Emphasis 
added by the Court) 231 P2d at 727. 
It is the contention of the Appellants that any mistake 
on the Respondents' behalf could have easily been avoided by 
the exercise of ordinanry care and diligence. This position 
is strengthened by the CJS discussion of unilateral mistake as 
it relates to specific performance: 
"Even a mistake which is entirely defendant's own, or that of 
his agent, and for which plaintiff is n~t.directly or 
indirectly responsible, may defeat specific performance. 
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In such case, however, the mistake must be ~n honest one 
which is not imputable to defendant's negligence or in-
excusable carelessness, and the situation must be such 
that a granting of specific performance will work an un-
reasonable hardship on defendant as compared with the in-
jury that will result to plaintiff from a denial of specif ' 
relief." CJS, Specific Performance, Section 51, pp. 833- ·· 
834. 
Moreover, it is doubtful if unilateral mistake of the 
type embodied in the instant case is sufficient to void the 
option. Unilateral mistake can readily be broken into two 
divisions: Mistakes of facts and mistakes of law. The situaL: 
surrounding the signing of the Lease and Option is better 
classified as belonging to mistakes of law since the Responden~, 
admitted at trial that they were fully aware of the option 
provisions in the Lease and Option but supposedly failed to 
comprehend its legal consequences. 
Traditionally, courts of equity have been hesitant to 
provide relief for mistakes of law. This position is illustra:-
by a portion of the decision rendered in Board of Education of 
Sevier School District vs Board of Education of Piute School 
District, 39 P2d 340 (1934) on page 341: 
"So, too, in 13 C. J. 379, the author says that it is laic 
down in general language in many cases that a mistake, 
in order that it may affect a contract, must be a mistake 
of fact, and that a mere mistake of law will not affect 
the enforceability of an agreement, and that a mistake 
of law is where the person knows the facts of the case 
but is ignorant of the legal consequences." 
There are no other Utah cases directly analogous to the 
present case, but decisions rendered by the Supreme Courts of 
two other western states are helpful. 
The first is Everett G. Schwieger vs Harry W. Robbins 
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Wash. 
and Company, 290 P2d 984 (1955). This case involved a personal 
injury action brought for injuries sustained when hay fell from 
the defendant's truck onto the plaintiff's truck. The court 
found for the defendant basing its decision on a release signed 
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed, contending that 
although the release specifically referred to personal injuries 
it had been given for the purpose of a property settlement. In 
finding for the defendant, the court emphasized: 
"The release is in plain and unambiguous language, We 
often have said that the courts will not interpret the 
meaning of unambiguous contracts. (Citations omitted) 
Neither will the courts permit oral ~vidence to establish 
or create an ambiguity in a written contract. . . . The 
appellant admits signing the release. He contends that he 
signed it because he believed no claim for personal in-
juries then existed under the law. A mistake of law is 
an erroneous conclusion with respect to the legal effect 
of known facts. A mistake of law, in the absence of fraud 
or some like cause, is not a ground for avoidance of a 
contract." 290 P2d 986. 
The second case, although dealing particularly with 
workman's compensation, includes an informative discussion as 
pertaining mistakes of law: 
"It is a legal maxim that everyone is presumed to know the 
law. . . . It has been held that a mistake of law does 
not excuse a party to a contract, unless it be a mutual 
mistake of both parties thereto, and then is analogous 
to a mistake of fact, but if there is mutuality of mis-
take either of law or of fact, the party upon whom the burd~n rests must allege and prove such fact." Elmer 
Lee Flott vs Wenger Mixer Manufacturing Co.L 189 Kan. 
80, 367 P2d 44 (19~1) ~ 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION FOR THE OPTION TO PURCHASE. 
The Court itself raised the issue as to whether an 
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Option to Purchase real property contained in a written lease 
of the same property must be supported by sufficient con-
sideration independent and separate from the consideration of 
other covenants and conditions set forth in the remaining 
paragraphs of the lease and option agreement. The Court expr":' 
its concern and raised this issue after reading the following 
language contained in 17 CJS, Contracts, Section l(l)(F) at 
page 542 and 543: 
"In the law of contracts, an option is an agreement to 
keep an offer open, or an offer to enter into a contract 
coupled with a promise to hold the offer open for a given 
period of time, which promise is or is not binding on the 
offerer depending on whether or not it is supported by 
consideration. In other words, it is a continuing offer 
or contract, made irrevocable for a fixed period when giver: 
for a present consideration. • " 
Defendants agree that an option to purchase must be sup-
ported by sufficient consideration. However, the above quoted 
language does not answer the question of what would constitute 
sufficient consideration in an option to purchase. In the case 
before the Court, defendants argue that the Lease and Option 
Agreement is a single document, that the Agreement sets forth 
the amount and number of rental payments to be made, and that 
the Option to Purchase clause contained in the Lease and Optioo 
Agreement need not be supported by independent consideration 
because the rental payments and other covenants and conditions 
of the Agreement constitute sufficient consideration to not 
only support and validate the Lease but also the Option to 
Purchase. The Court's question is answered and the defendants' 
position supported by 51C CJS, Landlord and tenant, Section 811 
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at page 238: 
"An.agreement whereby the lessee of property is given an 
option to purchase the leased premises, like other con-. 
tracts, must be supported by a sufficient consideration. 
Where the lease and the option constitute but one contract 
the provisions of which are interdependent, the consider- ' 
ation for the lease supports the option; in other words, 
the agreement to pay rent or do other acts, and the fulfill-
ment of such ob~igations on the part of the lessee, will 
support the option as well as the right to occupy under 
the lease. Thus, an option to purchase contained in a 
lease is not subject to attack on the ground that it is 
unilateral and lacks mutuality in that it binds the lessor 
notwithstanding the lessee is not bound to purchase." 
The only Utah case touching upon the issue is Tilton vs 
Sterling Coal & Coke Company, 28U 173, 77 P 758 (1904)~ In 
dispute was an Agreement containing a Lease of and accompanying 
Option to Purchase water. That Utah Supreme Court addressed 
itself to the issue of whether the lessee could exercise the 
Option to Purchase within a reasonable time after the Lease had 
terminated. However, the opinion contains the following dictum 
which is relevant to the case presently before the Court: 
"When an option is given to a lessee to purchase the 
leased premises, the lease is a sufficient consideration 
to support the option, and the lessor cannot withdraw it 
before the time given in which to accept it has expired. 
77P at 760." 
For the sake of brevity, defendants cite a sampling of 
judicial opinions throughout the Western States only. In 
Carlena vs Vollmert Tire Company, 540 P2d 1149 (Colorado 1975) 
plaintiff lessor commenced legal proceedings to terminate the 
Lease and obtain possession of the premises from defendant lessee. 
On appeal from adverse trial court decision, plaintiff lessor 
contended that the Option to Purchase clause contained in the 
Lease Agreement was not supported by consideration. The Court's 
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opinion contains a verbatim quote of the Option to Purchase 
clause: 
"(2) It is further agreed that at any time prior to 
April 1, 1977, and within ninety (90) days following 
April 1, 1977, the lessee, only, shall have an option to 
purchase all the entire building at a total purchase 
price of ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND AND N0/100 ($110,000), 
said sum of money, being the total purchase price, and shai' 1 
be paid to the lessor by the lessee under the following -
terms and conditions. " 540 P2d at 1150. 
The Colorado Appellate Court affirmed the trial Court, and 
disagreed with plaintiff lessor's argument that the Option to 
Purchase lacked consideration: 
"There is also no merit in the lessor's final contention 
that the option to purchase clause was not supported by 
consideration. As the trial court found, such clauses are \ 
supported by the reciprocal promises in the lease, such 
as the lessee's promise to pay rent." Id. at page 1151. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that an option to pur-
chase contained in a lease is supported by consideration in 
Braten vs Baker, 323 P2d 929 (Wyoming 1958). Therein, plain-
tiffs sought specific performance after they elected to exer-
cise the purchase option contained in the written lease agree-
ment. The lease agreement was partially printed and partial~ 
type written, and contained the following option to purchase 
clause: 
"Party of the second part shall have the option of pur-
chasing said real property at the end of five years for 
the sum of $6, 000. 00. Interest included. Payment to be 
made at the rate of $500. 00 on March 1, 1955, and a like 
amount on the first day of March on each year thereafter 
until the full amount is paid. 323 P2d at page 930. 
Defendant lessor contended on appeal that the option to 
purchase was not supported by consideration and therefore void. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, holding: 
i 
~ 
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"It seems so well settled that a purchase option contained 
in a lease is supported by consideration that elaboration 
should be unnecessary. See James, Law of Option Contracts 
1916 ed., Section 101, p. 2, Section 321, p. 135; 51 CJS ' 
Landlord and Tenant Section 81, p. 636; Bacon vs Kentucky 
Cent. Ry. C., 95 Ky. 373, 379, 380, 25 S. W. 747, 749, 16 
Ky. Law Rep. 77, 80; McCormick vs Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 
257, 262, 41 A. 840, 842, Id., 61 N. J. Eq. 208, 48 A. 
25; rrank vs Stratford-Handcock, 13 Wyo. 37, 54, 55, 77 
P. 134, 137, 67 L. R. A. 571; 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and 
Tenant, Section 299, pp. 278, 279; 5 Williston, Contracts, 
Rev. ed. 1936, Section 1441, p. 4026." Id. at page 931. 
In Mccreight vs Girardo, 287 P2d 414 (Oregon 1955)~ the 
Appellate Court, in ruling, inter alia, on the validity of an 
option to purchase clause contained in a real estate lease agree-
ment, stated the following: 
"This lease contains a right which, if seasonably exercised 
by the defendant, could have changed the relationship from 
landlord and tenant to that of vendor and purchaser. 
The consideration stated in the lease furnishes the consider-
ation for the option to purchase. . . " 287 P2d at 417. 
The option to purchase clause contained in that lease 
agreement read as follows: 
"Lessee shall have an option to purchas.e the above des-
cribed premises during the term of this lease or renewal 
thereof, for the purchase price of Twenty Six Thousand 
Dollars ($26,000.00)~ upon terms which will be mutually 
agreed upon by the parties hereto at the time of said 
purchase. It being understood that Lessee will be given 
credit on said purchase price of the amount of $100.00 per 
month for each month of rental paid to Lessor during the 
life of this lease or any renewal thereof." Id. at page 
415. 
rinally, in Bell vs Minor, 199 P2d 718 (California 1949) 
defendant lessor appealed from the trial Court's decree of 
specific performance awarded to plaintiff lessee. At issue 
was the validity of a lease agreement containing an option to 
purchase clause. The California Court of Appeals stated: 
"The provisions of the lease, including the rental to be 
paid, furnish the consideration for the option to purchase." 
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199 P2d at 720. 
The foregoing case law and secondary authorities are di-
rectly applicable to the case presently before the Court. As 
a review of the Lease and Option Agreement will reveal, the Lea:; 
and Option to Purchase are contained in one single contract. 
Furthermore, paragraph 2 of said Agreement sets forth the rent,· 
payments to be paid on an annual basis, which, according to th, 
foregoing case law and secondary authorities, is sufficient in 
and of itself to also constitute sufficient consideration for 
the Option to Purchase. In addition, however, the Option to 
Purchase clause contained in paragraph 5 of the Agreement makes 
reference to the Lease payments and that the same shall apply 
towards the purchase price in the event that the defendant 
lessees exercise the Option to Purchase the real estate. Con-
sequently, the lease payments are directly tied into the granti~: 
of the Option to Purchase and constitute sufficient considera-
tion therefore. Finally, additional consideration in the forn 
of defendants agreeing to let plaintiffs retain a life estate 
on that portion of the property on which their home was locatec,: 
was given by defendants in return for the Option to Purchase. 
CONCLUSION 
There was a concise, written agreement between the Ap- , 
t - I pellants and the Respondents regarding the Lease and poten ~, 
purchase of the 28 acres of real property. The provisions of 
the Lease and Option were definite, unambiguous, and to the 
point. All of the parties read the document, had ample time 
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to consider its ramifications, and had opportunity to consult 
with the attorney who had prepared it. 
A reasonable person could ascertain the scope of the in-
strument by a quick reading of its contents. The Respondents 
themselves had occasion for a thorough analysis of its con-
tents. If they indeed were mistaken, the mistake was attributable 
to their own negligence and was a mistake as to the legal 
consequences of their signing. The Appellants, themselves 
prudent throughout their dealings in the matter, should not now 
be deprived of their option to purchase because of a 
careless mistake on the part of the other parties to the trans-
action. 
Case law firmly supports the proposition that there was 
sufficient consideration to support the option. This issue, 
as suggested by the Trial Court itself, was the critical factor 
in determining the validity of the Lease and Option. The trial 
Court erred in denying the Appellants' prayer for specific 
performance on grounds quite apart from this determinative 
factor. The Appellants should now have their option declared 
fully valid and they should be granted specific performance of 
their right to purchase. 
DATED this ;-7fj day of December, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MICHAEL R. JENSEN 
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen 
Professional Building 
90 West 1st North 
Price, Utah 84501 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
By 
-) / ' ') ' 1; I / / ,// 
.., '' (: ·., ' y ' '' ji(· 
/ I I if ........ 
MI CHA EL fl • JENSE°'N 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellants' Brief with 
postage prepaid this /7/i. __ day of December, 1977, to the attornej 
for Respondents addressed as follows: Donn E. Cassity, ROMNEY, 
NELSON & CASSITY, 136 South Main Street, Suite 404, Kearns Build' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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